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The term “Fishing Down Marine Food Webs” describes the gradual transition in land-
ing from marine ecosystems towards organisms lower in the food web. To address this
issue and the need to manage the marine ecosystem in a broader perspective, Ecosys-
tem Management is recommended. Ecosystem Management, however, requires mod-
els that can link the ecosystem level to the operation level, so this paper examines
an ecosystem production model and shows that it is suitable for applying ground rent
theory. This model is the simplest possible that incorporates the principles of size as
the main determinant of the predator–prey interaction, the inclusion of mass balance
in the predator–prey allocation, and mortality and somatic growth as consequences of
the predator–prey allocation.
The model needs to be parameterized for the speciﬁc ecosystem and the price
and cost functions must be established empirically before drawing the conclusion that
Fishing Down Marine Food Webs is economically detrimental can be established di-
rectly. Nevertheless, the model does reveal a need for intertemporal balance with
respect to both ﬁsh size and harvest volume. These aspects are not addressed in any
systematic way at the ecosystem level in the present management. Therefore, eco-
nomic predictions for an ecosystem managed as a common pool resource must be that
the exploitation probably are conducted at lower sized than optimum. In addition,
given its population stock approach, the present management probably overlooks the
ability of an ecosystem to sustain total volume of harvest.
Given the two aspects of intertemporal choice revealed by the model, the conclu-
sion must be that the Fishing Down Marine Food Webs is probably driven by the cur-
rent management’s inability to conduct adequate intertemporal balancing; therefore, it
is probably detrimental from an economic point of view. The marine ecosystem there-
fore requires an ecosystem management for economic reasons; in this context, models
like the one presented here can serve as useful planning tools.Contents
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The marine ecosystem seems to be degenerating; Pauly et al. (1998) found a decline
in the mean trophic level of global landings reported to FAO in the period 1950–1994.
The term they used for the gradual transition in the composition of these landings
from long-lived, high trophic1 piscovorous ﬁsh to short-lived, low trophic level in-
vertebrate and planktivorous ﬁsh was “Fishing Down Marine Food Webs.” Based on
their models, Christensen et al. (2003) established that catches of predator ﬁsh in the
North Atlantic increased in the late 1960s from 2.4 to 4.7 million tonnes annually
but then declined to below 2 million tonnes annually in the late 1990s. The biomass
of high trophic ﬁsh in the North Atlantic declined by two-thirds during the last 50
years and is now a ninth the size it was a century ago. In addition to this decline in
the biomass of high trophic ﬁsh, other unintended consequences of ﬁshing, such as
habitat destruction, incidental mortality of non-target species, evolutionary shifts in
population demographics, and changes in the function and structure of ecosystems,
are becoming increasingly recognized (Pikitch et al., 2004). To address the degrading
of the marine ecosystem, a management of the marine ecosystem in a broader per-
spective, Ecosystem-Based Fishery Management, is recommended by Pikitch et al.
(2004) and seven quoted references. Many other terms refer to the same idea, and
Garcia et al. (2003) discusses some of these terms, including Fishery Management,
Ecosystem Management, Ecosystem Approach, Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Manage-
ment, Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries, and Integrated Management.
The ecosystem concept is inseparable from the idea of an organizational hierarchy
in nature. Along with management comes the idea of strategic planing, where long-
term, large scale plans dominate short-term, more detailed plans. The present paper
uses the term “Ecosystem Management” to refer to the management of the marine
ecosystem in a broader context, and interprets Ecosystem Management as a manage-
ment theory that merges the idea of an organization hierarchy in nature and the idea of
strategic planning based on a planning hierarchy using the ecosystem as the strategic
planning level.2
In the marine ecosystem, operations are executed by ﬁshers catching ﬁsh at an
aggregate level not bigger than a shoal. A prerequisite for successful Ecosystem Man-
agement is the ability to create a quantiﬁable link from the strategic level, the ecosys-
tem, to the operation level, ﬁsh at an aggregated level not bigger than a shoal.2 In this
1Trophic means “relating or pertaining to nutrition and feeding”. Trophic level refers to the position in
the food chain.
2The arguments in this paragraph, as well as other arguments referring to this footnote, build on a more
comprehensive discussion in Ravn-Jonsen (2009a) that will be supply upon request to the author.
7paper, the model of Benoît and Rochet (2004) is extended with economics and numer-
ics to create this link.3 A renewable resource, such as a forest or a marine ecosystem,
gives its management a choice between exploiting the resource by, for example, cut-
ting a tree or catching a ﬁsh, or leaving that tree or ﬁsh to grow (or become food
for a larger ﬁsh). Exploiting the resource generates an immediate income, whereas
refraining from exploiting the resource allows it to be exploited in the future. If re-
fraining from exploiting the resource improves future income, the act can be seen as
an investment, and there is an intertemporal choice between exploiting or investing.
Consequently, the forest or the marine ecosystem must be treated as capital (in the
sense of production machinery) in that it may improve overall productivity if it is not
used immediately. This view, where the regenerating resource is treated as capital, is
known within forestry as the “Bodenreinertragslehre” (ground rent theory) and goes
back to Faustmann (1849) and Pressler (1860); Clark and Munro (1975) applied a sim-
ilar capital view in the analysis of ﬁsh stock. Because the hierarchies of plans under
strategic management must link both space and time, a model for strategic ecosystem
planning has to provide this hierarchical link and handle intertemporal balancing. The
model can therefore only be appropriated if its structure allows the ground rent theory
to be applied.
In responce to the concern regarding Fishing Down Marine Food Webs expressed
by Pauly et al. (1998), Hannesson (2002) simpliﬁes the ecosystem to a “one predator,
one prey” system and analyzes a model of the Lotka–Volterra type. Whether the ﬁsh-
ing down of the marine food chain is detrimental from an economic point of view is a
question of the relative prices of prey and predator species. The global optimum, how-
ever, will only be reached through the cooperative management of stocks. Hannesson
(2002) intended the model only for a discussion of principles, and his point is crucial:
If the ecosystem can be exploited at different levels of the trophic system, there must
be some exploitation patterns that are better than others; there will be an economic op-
timum and related problems when managing the ﬁshery as a common pool resource.
To be able to determine this optimum and thus to determine if Fishing Down Marine
Food Webs is detrimental from an economic point of view, models of the ecosystem
need to be suitable for economic analysis.
For practical applications, the Lotka–Volterra model used by Hannesson (2002) is
“woefully inadequate” (Hannesson, 2002, p. 755). The point of Hannesson, that the
optimum is a question of relative prices between prey and predator species, stem in
3Only the principles of the model will be described in present article; the details of the model as well,
as the numerical implementation and parameterization are documented in Ravn-Jonsen (2009b) that will
be supplied by the author upon request. An experiment with the ecosystem exploited by a population of
adaptive ﬁshers is also described in that paper.
8the model from prey abundance has a positive inﬂuence on predator growth, whereas
predator abundance has a negative inﬂuence on prey growth. This seems superﬁcial to
be an adequate approach, but in a true economic analysis the model has to reﬂect the
opportunity cost of catching the prey. The alternative to catching the prey is letting it
remain in the sea as prey for the predator. In other words, the model has to reﬂect the
production in the ecosystem when predators consuming prey, and predators grow as a
result of the consumption.
One other problem with the use of population models as production models is
the life story and predator–prey relationship in the marine ecosystem. In the marine
ecosystem, most species lief begin with a small egg that turn into a larva with a mass
typically well below 1g, succeeded by somatic growth4 and reaches, in some cases,
a size larger than 100kg. Two ﬁsh of the same size but of different species are much
morealikewithrespecttofoodpreferenceandpredatorriskthan, forexample, twoﬁsh
of the same species but of different sizes (Jennings et al., 2001; Scharf et al., 2000).
Because all species come in a continuum of size and because the predator–prey rela-
tionship in the marine ecosystem is to a large extent determined by size, it seems futile
to construct a production model based on species. Furthermore, population models
traditionally operate with population growth, which is a combination of an increase in
the number of individuals and the somatic growth of the individual ﬁsh. In a produc-
tion model, predation results in the mortality of the prey and the somatic growth of the
predator. The somatic growth leads to individuals growing in size which in turn leads
to a dietary shift towards larger prey. In a simple two compartment predator–prey
model, the prey will, following somatic growth, advance and become the predator.
This ﬂow caused by somatic growth is another opportunity for catching the prey, and
a production model must incorporate it.2
Fewotherattemptstobuildecosystemmodelssuitableforeconomicanalysisexist.
Ecopath, the model behind both the Pauly et al. (1998) and Christensen et al. (2003)
articles, does use the predator–prey interaction to drive the dynamics of the model.
Ecopath, however, focuses on modelling the population-community and therefore at-
tempts to build a population–process model. As discussed above, using the species as
the division criteria for production functionality seems to be problematic, and a model
of this type probably cannot give long term predictions with a reasonably small attrac-
tor.2 The intention of the Ecopath model is indeed to estimate the energy ﬂow in the
ecosystem (Christensen, 1995) rather than to perform long-term economic analysis.
4Somatic growth means bodily growth and is different from population growth, which is used in pop-
ulation and community models. Population growth is a combination of an increase in numbers and the
somatic growth of the individuals.
9Two other examples are Finnoff and Tschirhart (2003), where general equilibrium
theory is applied to the predator–prey interaction in a species community model, and
Sanchirico et al. (2005), where portfolio investment theory is applied to the stocks
of populations. Both of these are attempts to apply economic models to ecosystem
components. The Finnoff and Tschirhart general equilibrium model is built on the
concept of an input–output matrix in the predator–prey interaction and in this way
takes a production view of the ecosystem. There do not, however, seem to have been
any attempts to apply capital theory to the model. The model of Sanchirico et al.
treats the different populations as investment portfolio objects. The model does not,
however, build on a theory of production in the ecosystem. Like the Ecopath model,
both models are tied to the population–community view of ecosystem.
The approach of this paper is to perform economic analysis of a model that stems
from a theory of production in the ecosystem. As such, this is, to my knowledge, the
ﬁrst attempt to apply ground rent theory to a model of a marine ecosystem.
The model is a size-based production model developed to examine the conse-
quences of ﬁshing in a marine ecosystem as a trophic system. This model’s structure
is quite simple, and the only attributes of the ﬁsh taken into consideration are size and
abundance(density). Themodelcannot, however, beanalyzedanalyticallybyrigorous
mathematics but must rely on experiments made using a numerical implementation of
the model. The model is, however, so simple in structure that the causal chains are
transparent.
At the heart of economic analyse is the intertemporal balancing of exploitation
and investment. This aspect can, for a solo owner, be managed by applying ground
rent theory. The intertemporal balancing issue is, however, interesting not only for the
purpose of ﬁnding the optimal point of exploitation given a solo owner with a speciﬁc
discount rate, but also because it gives insight into the economics of the dynamic
side of ecosystems and thereby the economic forces that drive the degrading of an
ecosystem under common pool management.
The purpose of this article, then, is twofold. First, the intertemporal balancing of
the exploitation of the marine ecosystem is analyzed in the context of the trophic level
of exploitation. Second, the details behind the economics are analyzed with the pur-
pose of obtaining a better understanding of the driving forces behind the degrading of
marine ecosystem. The structure of the paper is as follows. The size-based ecosystem
model, the ground rent theory, the applied method and the results are presented in sec-
tion 2. Only the main feature of the model is described in the next section. The more
technical details of the model are given in a separate paper that will be supplied by
the author upon request, but some technical details related to the analytical methods in
this paper are given in the appendix. In section 3, the results and their consequences
10are discussed along with an attempt to deduce some consequences for management
based on the ﬁndings of this paper.
An economic analysis can in principle show two extremes. Either it is economi-
cally reasonable to ﬁsh high in the trophic system, or it is reasonable to ﬁsh low in the
trophic system. The management of the ecosystem is, however, facing other problems
besides the decline in high trophic level ﬁsh, including habitat destruction, shifts in
population demographics, loss of biodiversity and changes in the function and struc-
ture of ecosystems. Many of these problems are related to high ﬁshing pressure. If
it is economically sensible to ﬁsh high in the tropic system, an economically sensi-
ble management will reduce ﬁshing pressure, and many of the other problems facing
management and related to high ﬁshing pressure will to some extent be remedied by
economically sensible management. On the other hand, the situation is more com-
plicated if an economic analysis shows show that the optimum is low in the trophic
system because then the collateral effects of ﬁsheries are costs that have to be evalu-
ated or those ﬁsheries may have to be restricted for the protection of the ecosystem.
An economic analysis is important in order to know if the current management is
economically unwise or if it is economically sensible but fails to value or consider
the collateral effects. Accordingly, this papers focus on the economics related to the
exploiting of a marine ecosystem by a ﬁshery.
There are many other anthropic impacts on the marine ecosystem that an ecosys-
temmanagerhastoconsider, suchaspollutionandnutritionload. Thispaper, however,
is limited to a discussion of the ﬁshery.
2 Methods and Results
2.1 The size-based ecosystem model
The marine ecosystem has as its atomic production unit the individual ﬁsh,5 and the
production itself is the somatic growth of the ﬁsh. In order to produce, the ﬁsh has to
consume other organisms like, for example, other ﬁsh. The ﬁsh is then a product as
well; it can be caught by humans or be internally distributed between other production
units. Thus the atomic product of marine ecosystem is the individual ﬁsh, and this
product may be internally allocated by a predator–prey interaction, or it may be caught
by humans as an outlet from the ecosystem. This duality, the ﬁsh as both the product
and production unit, is a common feature of renewable resources.
5The model do not distinguish according to phylogeny, so that a ﬁsh can be any organism.
11It is impossibly to model every single organism in an ecosystem, and the ﬁsh has to
be stratiﬁed appropriately. When the ﬁsh is stratiﬁed, the internal allocation between
production units can be described as an input–output matrix with the strata as both
rows and columns. Stratiﬁed appropriately then means stratiﬁed in a manner such the
predator–prey interaction matrix is predictable. This predictability can be expected
if the ﬁsh is stratiﬁed according to its function in the trophic system.2 In the marine
ecosystem, the function of the individual ﬁsh, as seen in a trophic context, is closely
related to the size of the ﬁsh. Two ﬁsh of the same size but of different species are
more alike with respect to food preferences and predator risk than, for example, two
ﬁsh of the same species but of different sizes (Jennings et al., 2001; Scharf et al.,
2000). Furthermore, the predators in the marine ecosystem are generally considerably
larger than their prey, and body size is therefore a rough indicator of trophic level
(Borgmann, 1987). In other words, the distribution of individuals with respect to size
can be seen as a mapping of the trophic system.
Consequently, the organisms in the sea are stratiﬁed in the model according to their
body mass m, referred to as their size. The strata, or bins, are made inﬁnitesimally
small, transmuting the strata into a continuum of m. The model’s state variable is
concernedwiththenumberofﬁshintheseaofagivensize. ThestatevariableN(t,m)
gives the density of ﬁsh of size m at time t and is referred to as the spectrum. Strictly
speaking, density refers to both volume and mass. The density with respect to volume
just signiﬁes that the model reﬂects one representative cubic meter of water, and its
unit therefore is per cubic meter of sea. The density with respect to mass signiﬁes that
in order to know the number of ﬁsh in a size interval between, for example, m1 and
m2, the density has to be integrated:
´ m2
m1 Ndm.
In ﬁgure 1 the processes of the model are illustrated. The diagram illustrates the
populationspectrumwithsizeastheabscissaandthedensityasordinate; theblackline
then illustrates N(m), and the pink illustrates that the N is a density and that to know
the distribution of the ﬁsh, N has to be integrated, hence the area under the curve. The
N is drawn as a line; if the two axis are both logarithmic, a pristine ecosystem without
a ﬁshery is expected to form a straight line with a slope of approximately -2 (Andersen
and Beyer, 2006).
Two black curved arrows go from top to bottom, marked µN at the top and EN
at the bottom. These arrows represent the driver of the dynamics in the ecosystem:
the predator–prey interaction. This interaction creates a mortality of µN for the prey
and leads to the consumption of EN by the predator. To be a production model, the
predator–prey interaction must adhere to the principle of conservation of mass. This
is in a discrete model secured by an input–output matrix; as the strata turn into a
















Figure 1: The elements of the model. See the text for explanation.
13dimensional interaction density. This approach ensures the conservation of mass in
the system so that for every consumed ﬁsh there is a corresponding demise.
Consumption leads to the somatic growth g of the predator. As a ﬁsh’s only at-
tribute in this model is its size, a ﬁsh is a point in the m-dimension. When a ﬁsh
grows and therefore increases in size, this point moves up the m-dimension with a
speed of g. The total effect of all the ﬁsh with somatic growth is the ﬂow of particles
with a ﬂux, the number of particles passing a given point, of gN. This is illustrated
in the ﬁgure 1 by the dark red points and arrows marked gN. In the model, growth is
a consequence of consuming prey g = g(E). The somatic growth is always smaller
than the consumed food, and the difference represents fecal waste, respiration and
reproduction.
At the top of the ﬁgure, green arrows marked νN represent the mortality due to
the ﬁshery, and the same mass balance principle applies to this interaction. What is
caught has to equal what leaves the ecosystem.
From the predator–prey interaction and ﬁshery interaction, the growth and mortal-
ity are derived, leading to the dynamics of the spectrum. As growth leads to a ﬂux
gN of particles in the spectrum, the dynamics in the spectrum can be described with a






− µN − νN (1)
The partial differential equation (1), known as the Kendrick–von Foerster equation, is
the main engine in this model. Turning the equation into a model requires assumptions
regarding the predator–prey interaction, the growth function and how the ﬁshery ex-
tracts ﬁsh from the system—these assumptions follow Benoît and Rochet (2004) and
Andersen and Beyer (2006).3 The equation system describes a spectrum with no ends;
however, to turn it into a model, the spectrum has to be limited, and the process related
to the parts of the spectrum below and above the deﬁned bounds need to be accounted
as external factors. In the model, there are three external impacts:
1. Organisms at the lower end of the spectrum will have their main prey outside
the spectrum. This is addressed by applying a ﬁxed extra consumption to the
lower end of the spectrum, represented in ﬁgure 1 by blue arrows.
2. The ﬁrst point N1 in the spectrum has to be supplied at every iteration cycle as
a boundary condition. In the numeric implementation, it is the equilibrium level
without a ﬁshery.
3. Organisms at the upper end of the spectrum will have their main predators out-
side the spectrum. This is addressed by applying a ﬁxed extra mortality rate to
14the upper end of the spectrum, represented in ﬁgure 1 by red arrows.
The purpose of this model is to weigh the trade-offs related to ﬁsheries targeting differ-
ent sizes in the trophic system. The economic inferences made therefore have to relate
solely to the dynamics caused by the predator–prey interaction and not to changes in
external inputs. Therefore, the inputs to the model are ﬁxed by items 1 and 2 in the list
above, and different ﬁsheries cannot affect these inputs. The restrictions on the global
inputs to a ﬁxed consumption input at the lower end of the spectrum is equivalent to
an assumption that the primary production be ﬁxed and independent of the abundance
at higher trophic levels.
The model represents a trophic system and, as such, there is a ﬂow through the
system. Inputs enter in the lower end and, in an ecosystem without a ﬁshery, indi-
viduals exit through an idle outlet in the upper end in the form of externally-caused
mortality. The ﬁshery changes the outlet towards human needs and brings a smaller
external mortality. Applying a ﬁxed rate of mortality in item 3, rather just a ﬁxed mor-
tality, implies that when the population density drops as a consequence of a ﬁshery, so
does the external mortality.
The ﬁshing mortality in the model is controlled by an effort V and a target size
mf. The effort V is proportional to ﬁshing vessels, and they are ﬁshing as if they are
targeting ﬁsh of a size near mf. They cannot, however, target the size exactly. The
ﬁsh are caught around the mf with a ﬁshing mortality rate proportional to a Gaussian
function with respect to the logarithm of m. The breadth parameter of the Gaussian
density function is kept ﬁxed at 1, and in the present analysis only one target is allowed
in each experiment.
The numerical implementation3 follows Benoît and Rochet (2004) and transforms
the size variable logarithmically so that the size dimension in the model is transformed
into x, where exp(x) = m. At the same time, the target for the ﬁshery mf is trans-
formed into ξ, where exp(ξ) = mf. This transformation is necessary not only for a
proper numerical implementation, but also because it mirrors a view with a long tra-
dition in size spectrum analysis that relative size differences are more important than
absolute size differences. Henceforth, the size of ﬁsh will be referred to as x and the
target of ﬁshing as ξ. Furthermore, in the numerical analysis where the analysis relies
onsmallchangesinthetarget, thechangeswillbesmallwithrespecttothelogarithmic
scale.
Figure 2 is a sketch of how the model is used for experiments. The model has two
controls: the target size ξ and the effort V of the ﬁshery. In the present analysis, they
are only allowed to be single-valued. When the model is run with a set of controls, the
output is a new population spectrum and the harvest summarized by the volume H and
15Figure 2: Principle of experiment design
the mean size x. When a price and cost function are applied, the model also outputs
the revenue and the rent π. The employed price function P = P(m) is a sigmoid
function as illustrated in ﬁgure 3. The cost is a ﬁxed cost per unit effort, meaning that
the total cost is proportional to effort and the harvest is proportional to effort and the
density of ﬁsh.
An equally spaced grid is deﬁned in the ξ × V space. For each of the gridpoints,
the model is run until it converges to a steady state, and the population structure, the
volume of harvest H and the mean target x of the catch are recorded together with
the rent denoted by ˇ π for the sustainable yield rent. This steady-state situation is the
point of departure for all further analysis. In ﬁgure 4, the sustainable yield rent ˇ π
as a function of the controls is shown, whereas in ﬁgure 5, the rent as a function of
sustainable harvest volume and mean size is shown.
2.2 Ground Rent Theory
In classic economics, the production function has two factors of production: capital
K and variable factors L. An increase in K is called an investment, and what is left of
the revenues from production after the costs of variable factors and the maintenance
of capital are defrayed, is called rent. If this view is applied to renewable resources,
the two factors of production are the renewable resource as a capital and other factors
as variable input. In the case of the marine ecosystem, the ecosystem is the capital,
and the ﬁshing vessels with crews and supplies are the input factors. When the ex-
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Figure 3: The employed price function.
tracted renewable resources are sold and the cost of the variable factors are defrayed,
what is left is a rent from the capital; the resource rent. As renewable resources have
the product–production unit duality, investment in renewable resources can, in many
cases, be the same as refraining from exploiting the resource. If exploiting the re-
source is postponed, the future rent may be larger. If the increase in rent in the future
is larger than the forgone rent now, the decision whether to postpone extraction is an
intertemporal choice.
Faustmann (1849) introduces present value calculation as a tool for the economic
valuation of capital,6 in Faustmann’s case, the value of an immature forest stand.
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Figure 4: Sustainable rent surface. This diagram shows rent contours in control space.
The red line is the zero rent contour, and the stationery point is the maximum rent
point. The vertical dashed line indicates the points of maximum rent given a ﬁxed
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Figure 5: Rent contours in sustainable yield space. The red line is the zero rent con-
tour, and the stationery point is maximum rent. The dashed line from the upper-left
corner to the lower-right corner indicates the points of maximum rent given a ﬁxed
harvest, whereas the other dashed line indicates points of maximum rent given a ﬁxed
mean size.






where ρ is the discount rate and π is the rent. The insight Faustmann conveyed by
applying (2) was that the value of the forest consists of the expected rent in the future
rather than just the net value of the trees. A consequence of this view is that the value
of bare land is the present value of the rent that could be earned from a forest planted
on the land (or an alternative use of the land). The concept of present value for capital
valuation entered general economic theory by Fisher (1906) and represents today a
paradigm within economic theory.
After the concept of capital value, the concept of maximizing the capital value as




Here y represents a vector of all possible management controls. This idea was ﬁrst
introduced and solved by Pressler (1860).
The consequences of the Faustmann’s view is that the scare resource is the land
where the forest is situated, or more precisely, the time that the forest occupies the
land. Therefore the management objective (3) will in forestry lead to an optimal ro-
tation age for a forest stand. Pressler did not ﬁnd the optimal rotation age by solving
the maximization problem directly, instead he argued for the calculation of the Weiser
rate7 w (indicator rate) as the relative rate of increase in the capital value of a spe-
ciﬁc stand next year. This indicator rate w is then compared with the discount rate ρ;
if w > ρ, the stand is accumulating value faster than the discount rate and is better
spared. When w = ρ, it will be time for felling. A stand with a w < ρ indicates a
overmature stand.
Before Pressler (1860), the ideal of a forest management was the normal forest
deﬁned as a forest composed of as many stands as the rotation age used in the forest.
One stand is then cleared each year, and in this way there will be one stand of each
different age from newly cultivated to mature stands. As one stand of the same size
and age is harvested each year, the outlet from the normal forest is the same each
year. The Pressler (1860) management objective freed the forest management from
contributions.
7Pressler (1860) use the term Weiser-Prozent (indicator percent) .
20the normal forest, but the concept of the normal forest is still often used as a model
forest. Together with the management objective (3), the normal forest represents the
perception of sustainable forestry: A relatively stable production system, a continuous
ﬂow of rent and the maximization of the capital value of the production system.
Itisthe“Bodenreinertragslehre”, thelandrenttheorydescribedabove, thatIintend
to apply to the marine ecosystem. Instead of the term land rent theory, I shall use the
term ground rent theory. Here, “ground” means “the basis,” speciﬁcally the basis for
the production of the ecosystem; precipitation, sun light, wind, soil, nutrition, water,
and so on, together with the pool of genetic information. It is on this ground that the
rent originates. As some of the ground is tied closely to a speciﬁc site, ground can also
mean both the site and the ﬁshing ground; thereby indicating the need to focus on a
well-deﬁned physical area.
The paper therefore adopts the management objective as formulated in (3). To be
speciﬁc, the objective is (3), where the rent π is subjected to the size-based ecosystem
model and y represents the control parameters of the model. It is assumed that the
optimum exists with a ﬁxed set of controls y as opposed to a set of controls that
can change over time y(t). The size-based ecosystem model will, when a ﬁxed set
of controls is applied, approach a steady state with a constant outlet. The desired
situation is therefore a normal ecosystem, a stable system with respect to production
and structure, and a continuous outlet and rent.
2.3 Methods




for all yi in the control vector. In other word, at the optimum, the change in capital
value will be zero for all (inﬁnitesimal) changes in controls. The present model has
two controls: ξ and V . According to (4), the set of controls that gives the maximum

























I intend perform a comprehensive analysis of the model system and ﬁnd the opti-
mum points for all discount rates ρ > 0. Instead of ﬁnding the optimum point for a
21given discount rate, an indicator w similar to Pressler’s Weiser rate is calculated. As
an indicator rate w, the internal rates of return for small changes in ξ and V are used.
















0 e−ρtπ(t)dt = 0
(7)
The controls of the optimum point given the discount rate ρ can then be found as the



















If equation (6) and (7) are substituted into (8), the result is (5) and thus points that
satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition (4). The equation (8) will therefore ﬁnd all relevant
candidates for the management object (3).
The use of an internal rent of return has its limitations. If the rent ﬂow is not
normal,8 there may be more than one root for (6) or (7); a discussion of where normal
rent ﬂows can be expected is given in appendix.
2.4 Experiments
As the point of departure for all experiments, a convergence to a steady state is found
for every point in a grid covering an appropriate part of the control space ξ×V . From
this steady state, an experiment A is run with small but ﬁxed changes in controls for
100years. The rent πt(A) is recorded for each time step. Another experiment B is
performed in the same manner but with the opposite sign on the change in controls.












where Cρ(A) is the capital value of the rent ﬂow πt(A) calculated with the discount
rate ρ.
8A normal rent ﬂow only crosses the zero rent line once; running either from negative to positive, or
the reverse for disinvestment.
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Figure 6: Internal rate of return contours for an increase in target size. The lines
indicate points where the internal rate of return wξ for an increase in target size given




First, V is ﬁxed and ξ variable, and the internal rate of return wξ is found for all
relevant grid points. By interpolation, the lines lξ
w through points with same wξ are
generated. The lines lξ
w indicate the points in the control space where an increase in




in target size will lead to both a short-term decrease of rent and a decrease in long-term
































Figure 7: Internal rate of return contours for an increase in effort. The lines indicate
points where the internal rates of return wV to an increase in effort given a ﬁxed target
size are the same. The numbers indicate wV , and the contour lines are labelled lV
w in
the text.
sustainable yield rent as well. The increase in size is then not an investment and there
is no intertemporal choice. To the left of the blue line lξ
∞, an increase in target will
lead to both short and long-term gains. Increase in size is then not an investment, and
there is no intertemporal choice.
Next, ξ is ﬁxed and V variable, and internal rate of return is found for all relevant
grid points. By interpolation, the lines lV
w through points with same wV are generated.
The lines lV
w indicate the points in the control space where a decrease in effort is an
investment where an internal rent of return of wV is generated by the ecosystem—in
24ﬁgure 7 the lines are shown. Below the red line lV
0 , a decrease in effort will lead to
both a short-term decrease of rent and a long-term decrease in sustainable yield rent.
The decrease in effort is then not an investment, and there is no intertemporal choice.
To the left of the blue line lV
∞, a decrease in effort will lead to both short and long-
term gains. Decrease in effort is then not an investment, and there is no intertemporal
choice.
The point where the lines lV
w and lξ
w crosses is, according to (8), a candidate for the
optimum point given the discount rate ρ = w. There is only one such point for each
discount rate, and the monotonicity of wξ and wV reﬂect the concavity of the capital
values. The point where the lines lV
w and lξ
w cross is therefore an optimum point. In
ﬁgure 8, the blue line indicates the optimum points given discount rates from zero to
inﬁnity, with each point marking some speciﬁc ρ.
Sustainable yield space
The control space may be a rather academic concept. It is, after all, only variables
in a model that are the results of decisions made by ﬁshers and are in practice not
measurable. What can be measured is the output; the harvest volume and the size.
This is summarized in the model by the output parameters H, the total volume of
the harvest, and x, the mean size of harvest ﬁsh. It may be of more use to know the
economics of changes in the sustainable yield harvest volume and mean size. For
every gridpoint of the model in ξ × V space, there is a corresponding steady-state
point in x × H space: the sustainable yield space ΩSY . In ﬁgure 5, the rent contours
are shown in the x × H space. The sustainable yield space ΩSY is clearly restricted
to a subset in the lower left part of the total output space. The mapping of (ξ,V ) on
x × H space by the model is unambiguous, and there is therefore a reverse mapping
for all (x,H) ∈ ΩSY on ξ × V space.
To analyze the consequences of moving to another point in the sustainable yield
space, the controls have to change. In the present analysis, the controls are changed
once to the values corresponding to the desired point, this induces ﬂuctuations in the
harvest, sizes and the resulting rent.
Similar to the analyses of control space, this analysis is performed by ﬁrst aiming
for a ﬁxed H and a variable x, and the internal rate of return is found for all relevant
grid points. From these points, the lines lx
w are found by interpolation, giving the
points in the sustainable yield space where a change in the controls with the aim of
increasing mean size is an investment and an internal rent of return of w is generated
by the ecosystem.
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Figure 8: Optimal points in control space. The blue lines and points are optimum
points given the discount rate as indicated by the numbers. The grey line is rent con-
tours, the red line is lV
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Figure 9: Optimal points in sustainable yield space. The diagram shows the optimal
points given a discount rate ρ. The points are found at the cross of the lx
w and the lH
w
lines where ρ = w. The lx
w is shown below the optimal line, and the lH
w is shown
above. The sustainable yield rent contours are shown in grey.
return is found for all relevant grid points. From these points, the lines lH
w are found
by interpolation. These lines give the points in the sustainable yield space where a
change in controls with the aim of decreasing the harvest is an investment and where
an internal rent of return of w is generated by the ecosystem. The optimal points given
a discount rate ρ = w are found where the lx
w and lH
w lines cross, see ﬁgure 9. These
points correspond to the optimal points found in the control space.
273 Discussion
The present model is the simplest possible using the principles of size as the determi-
nant of the predator–prey interaction, mass balance in the predator–prey allocation and
mortality and somatic growth as consequences of the predator–prey allocation. The
ﬁsh has therefore only one attribute, its size. The model can be enhanced by applying
other dimensions important in an ecosystem context, such as space or a life story. A
discussion related to details in the model, parameterization, numerical implementation
and possibly enhancements are, together with the details of the model and its numeri-
cal implementation, found in a separate paper that will be supplied by the author upon
request.
Thispaperappliesthe“Bodenreinertragslehre”—thegroundrenttheory—ofFaust-
mann (1849) and Pressler (1860) to the marine ecosystem. The analysis is performed
as a normal ecosystem analysis with the underlying management objectives of a rel-
atively stable production system, a continuous ﬂow of rent, and the maximization of
the capital value of the production system. The present analysis is therefore performed
on a near steady-state system. The concept of an ecosystem in a steady-state situation
is, however, an idealization not found in the real world. The present model and the
method of economic analysis can handle dynamic situations as well. The dimensions
of the controls and outputs will, however, increase as a result of allowing dynamics
in the system, and results will be much less transparent. Therefore, as a useful sim-
pliﬁcation, the normal ecosystem approach is applied, and as the strategic goal can
be deﬁned as a steady state, the platonic world of a steady-state ecosystem are useful
for strategic planning. The presented experiments show that the size-based ecosys-
tem model has a structure suitable for evaluating the intertemporal choices raised by
ground rent theory. The model is therefore suitable as a tool for the strategic planning
of marine ecosystems.
The analysis of the size-based ecosystem model determines the optimum given a
discount rate in ﬁgure 4 and 5. The speciﬁc path for optimum points given speciﬁc dis-
count rates may seem of little interest because the object for the model is the long-term
planning of an ecosystem. Here, discount rates in the interval of 1%–6% is probably
appropriated. The whole analysis gives, however, additional knowledge about the eco-
nomics related to the exploitation of the ecosystem. In ﬁgure 9, the lines above the
optimum point line give the indicator rates wH of changing the controls with the aim
of reducing the harvest and keeping the mean size constant. Below the optimum point
line, the lines give the indicator rates wx of changing the controls with the aim of
increasing the mean size with the aim for the harvest unchanged. If a investment is
made by decreasing present rent, these lines represents the best of the two alternatives
28of reducing harvest volume or increasing size. Other combinations of changes in the
controls may give higher returns than those indicated by the lines, and so the lines
indicate a minimum for the best achievable rate of return the ecosystem will generate
in response to an investment made by a temporary decrease in rent. As seen in the
ﬁgure, there can be expected an extremely high return if management is able to move
the exploitation from an inferior point towards the optimum.
The present analysis is performed as a solo owner approach. In the real world,
the marine ecosystem is managed as a common pool with different states and many
ﬁshermen exploiting the common resource. When there is an intertemporal choice to
exploit the resource, the management of a common pool resource faces the problem
that the return on an investment made by a single ﬁsher refraining from harvesting
has to be shared with all other users. The ﬁsher has thus incentives not to invest
but to exploit. Only the point where there is no short term gain from changing the
controls will be stable in a common pool resource managed with open access. This
point corresponds to an inﬁnite internal rate of return, and ﬁshery economists (Clark,
1985, 1990) traditionally ﬁnd that the point of an inﬁnite discount rate for a solo owner
coincides with the open access equilibrium point. The same is true in this analysis.
The inﬁnity point in ﬁgure 8 and 9 is the expected point of equilibrium if ﬁshing is
conducted under open access and adaptive agents.3 The indicator rates with values
lower than inﬁnity in ﬁgure 9 then indicate where the management of a common pool
will be faced with challenges because the agents, ﬁshers and states, are participants in
a game where the returns on investments are not assigned to the investors. This will,
as discussed below, apply under management controls where only one of the control
variables or output variables is controlled.
The line lξ
∞, the green line in ﬁgure 8, indicates the equilibrium points for adaptive
agents free to set their target sizes but restricted by a effective effort control. This is
an equilibrium with respect to both the ecosystem and the agents’ choice of target. If a
ﬁshery with many agents is managed by a well-functioning effort control, the controls
will in equilibrium end up on the lξ
∞ line if this equilibrium is stable. If, for example,
the total effort is controlled as the maximum-rent effort, the ﬁshery will end up at point
U in ﬁgure 8. Effort control will therefore be inefﬁcient.
The line lx
∞, the lower red line in ﬁgure 9, indicates the equilibrium points for
adaptive agents free in their choice of mean size of harvest but restricted by a individ-
ual control on harvest volume. For example, if there is a total restriction on harvest
volume corresponding to the maximum rent harvest, the ﬁshery will end up with a sus-
tainable harvest at point U in ﬁgure 9 if this equilibrium is stable. Control on harvest
volume only is therefore inefﬁcient.
To get a deeper insight into the results, it is of interest to discuss in more detail
29what drives the model. There are two details in the model, namely how production is
formulated in the model, and the price and cost functions. As discussed below, these
two details together result in an economic force related to a trophic cascade that drives
the result.
The model is built to reﬂect the trophic system and is therefore explicit driven by
the predator–prey interaction. The alternative to catching a ﬁsh, leaving it as food
for predators or somatic growth, is therefore reﬂected in the economic analysis in a
realistic manner for ecosystem production. The model is simple. The only attribute of
the ﬁsh is its size, reﬂecting its position in the trophic system. It is of no surprise that
the economic analysis shows that size is important for management, this is, after all,
the idea and aim for the model.
The sigmoid price function in ﬁgure 3 reﬂects the idea that larger ﬁsh are more
valuable than small ones. The exact shape is hypothetical, however, if the price is not
increasing with size, the consequence is easy to predict: the catch have to be plankton
only. There are not many commercial landings of plankton, so somewhere in the
size spectrum the prices are increasing with size. The cost of ﬁshing in the model is
proportional to the effort, and the catch is proportional to the effort and the density of
ﬁsh. This is a very simple functional description, preferred by ﬁshery economics for
it simplicity, but it can probably be improved.
The trophic system reaction, together with the price and cost functions, drives the
need for intertemporal balancing. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 10. The data in the
ﬁgure represents the maximum rent point, or the optimum point with a discount rate
of zero. In the upper panel, the population density relative to the population density
in a pristine ecosystem without a ﬁshery is shown in black. The curve shows the
population density in a steady state as a result of a ﬁshery with controls corresponding
to the maximum rent point. The dashed vertical line indicates the target size, and
the pink curve illustrates the shape and breadth of the ﬁshing mortality rate. The
population shows what is known as a trophic cascade; the ﬁshery causes some part of
the spectrum to increase in density while others diminish. The population decreases
at and above the target size, and there is an enhancement below the target size. A
change in the target size to a lower target will, because of the increased population
density, have an especially high harvest before the population reacts on the change in
the controls. The lower diagram shows the instant rent ← → π , that is, the rent at time
t = 0 for a change in target size.
In the situation in ﬁgure 10, there is an instant gain from lowering the target size
that is represented by the negative slope of the instant rent curve where it crosses
the dashed line. There is thus a short-term gain from lowering the target, while the


























































Figure 10: Population density and short term rent. In the upper diagram the population
density relative to the population density in a pristine ecosystem without a ﬁshery is
shown in black. The diagram represents a steady state with a target size as shown by
the dashed vertical line. The pink curve illustrates the shape and breadth of the ﬁshing
mortality in the population. The lower diagram shows the rent at time t = 0 (the
instant rent ← → π ) given the target size is changed.
31cascade that, even under perfect effort control or output volume control, will drive the
ﬁshery towards smaller sizes lower in the trophic system.
Fishery economics traditional ﬁnd that under inferior regulation systems the ﬁsher
will apply more effort than is optimal. The present analysis agrees, but this model
reveals that the ﬁshery not only will apply an excess of effort, but also will target
smaller ﬁsh or lower in the trophic system than is optimal. In a compartment predator–
prey model (as e.g. Hannesson, 2002, a two compartment model), a similar trophic
cascade will drive the ﬁshery towards other species. The present model shows that the
economic drive caused by the trophic cascade is related with size, that is, the ﬁshery
can be expected gradually to target ﬁsh of smaller sizes, also within the same species.
Conclusion
The present model is the simplest possible given the principles of size as the deter-
minant of the predator–prey interaction, mass balance in the predator–prey allocation
and mortality and somatic growth as consequences of the predator–prey allocation.
The ﬁsh has therefore only one attribute, its size. The presented model creates a link
from ecosystem level to operation level, and, as shown in this article, it is suitable for
applying ground rent theory. The model is then suitable for strategic planning in an
ecosystem management context.
The model needs to be parameterized for the speciﬁc ecosystem, and the price and
cost functions have to be established empirically, before a conclusion as to whether
Fishing Down Marine Food Webs is detrimental from an economic point of view can
be drawn directly. Nevertheless, the model does reveal that there is a need for an in-
tertemporal balancing with respect to size. This aspect is not addressed in any system-
atic way on an ecosystem level under present management. Therefore, the economic
prediction for an ecosystem managed as a common pool is that the exploited ﬁsh are
too small in size.
The model also shows a need for an intertemporal balance in the volume of total
harvest on an ecosystem level. This aspect is traditionally found in population models
as well, but the present model is the ﬁrst model that can address the problem at an
ecosystem level in a capital theoretical context. There is therefore reason to suspect
that the present management, using a population approach where each population is
managed separately, overlooks the ability of the ecosystem to sustain the total volume
of harvest or at best target an inferior point in the sustainable yield space.
With the two aspects of intertemporal choice revealed by the model, the conclusion
must be that Fishing Down Marine Food Webs is probably driven by the inability of
common pool management to conduct proper intertemporal balancing, and that it is
32thereforeprobablydetrimentalfromaneconomicpointofview. Themarineecosystem
therefore needs ecosystem management also for economic reasons. In this context,
models like the present one can serve as planning tools.
Perspective
When, as shown above, the Fishing Down Marine Food Webs is detrimental and is not
properly addressed in present management, it may seem appropriate to suggest that
management use an instrument to remedy common pool management, such as a size-
dependent tax on landings. This would, however, be premature. The ecosystem has
other important properties, such as species and space, that have to be considered in an
ecosystem management context as well. A one-dimensional remedy of problems may
result in problems in other dimensions. Management regulation recommendations
have to await further research.
The model is, however, meant as a strategic planning tool; that is, it is meant to
be applied in a hierarchical planning context. One use of the model can then be to
set limits for the total harvest volume, properly weighted according to size, from a
marine ecosystem. As the model does not distinguish between species, other models
must handle this aspect. The total harvest determined by the model will have to be
divided in a hierarchical style, from the international level to the national level, the
regional level, and ﬁnally to the ﬁsher. One possible indicator of the landings being
in accordance with the model could be the mean size of landings. If the mean size is
decreasing over time, it is an indicator of disinvestment of the natural capital.
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A Technical details
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Figure 11: Rent ﬂow.The diagram shows the rent ﬂow following a small increase in
effort with red, a small decrease in effort with blue, and sustainable yield rent with no
change with black. The point is close to the optimal rent point






∞ are not found with internal rate of return in the same way
as the other lξ
w and lV
w. A normal rent ﬂow only crosses the alternative rent ﬂow once,
that is, the contribution margin from a management action is either ﬁrst positive and
then negative or the opposite. Most of the interesting part of the control space has a
normal rent ﬂow, but, near the lines l
ξ
0 and lV
0 , the long term change in rent is close
to zero. This implies that the rent ﬂow will cross the sustainable yield rent several
times, as in ﬁgure 11. The internal rent of return will be ambiguous, that is, there is
more than one root that solves equation (9) (or actual equation (27) later in appendix).
In the case of ﬁgure 11, both −0.078 and 0.008 satisfy the equation. The sustainable
yield is, in this case, unchanged, and the internal rate of return is solely caused by the
ﬂuctuation of the system. In this way, the concept of internal rate of return is losing
its meaning near the l
ξ
0 and lV
0 lines. This is especially the case near the lV
0 , as can be
seen in ﬁgure 7, where the left end of the lV
w lines indicates the point below which the














ˇ ξ = argmax
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ˇ V = argmax
V
ˇ π(ˇ ξ,V )

(11)
Where ˇ π indicates the sustainable yield rent, the rent given as a surface in ﬁgure 4.
These points are found by numeric optimization using a Golden Section search in
one dimension (see Press et al., 2007, p. 10.1) with effort and target size constant,
respectively. The lines as deﬁned in (10) and (11) correspond to the dashed lines in
ﬁgure 4.
The short term change of rent near the lines lξ
∞ and lV
∞ is very small, and the lines
can only be found as the point where the short term gain from a small change in the

































37Where ← → π is the instant rent if the control is changed, that is, the rent at time t = 0:
← → π |(ˇ ξ,ˇ V) (ξ,V ) = π|(ˇ ξ,ˇ V) (0,ξ,V )
Where
 ˇ ξ, ˇ V

indicates the controls of the steady-state situation. The controls are at
time t = 0 changed to (ξ,V ). At the time of a control change, the ﬁshery will harvest
in the steady-state population density of
 ˇ ξ, ˇ V

, so the instant rent per effort will be





  ˇ ξ, ˇ V
 =
ˇ π(ˇ ξ, ˇ V )
ˇ V
(14)
and the ∂← → π
∂V



















∞ is then found as the red line in ﬁgure 4.
To ﬁnd lξ
∞, there is a need to ﬁnd the instant rent with a change in ξ, the curve in
the lower diagram of 10. The instant rent is found by applying the ﬁshing selection
function θ to other ξ and ﬁnding the instant rent:




2 dx − c

(16)
where P is the price and c is the cost per unit effort. The partial derivatives ← → π 0
ξ are
found for all grid points, and the lξ
∞ are found as the line where ← → π 0
ξ = 0. These points
are found by interpolation (Akima et al., 2006) between the grid points.
A.2 Details related to output space
Although the curves in diagrams regarding the control space are drawn directly
through the values found as described, it has been necessary to smooth the
lines in diagrams regarding the output space by using cubic spline (with the
smooth.spline() function, R Development Core Team, 2006), or the curves
would be jagged. The reason for this is the accumulation of noise in the numeric
estimations: The analysis in this section relies on the numeric calculations of partial
deviates. The inputs for these calculations, as in others, are not the exact steady states
but a convergence to the steady states. In this way, some errors build up through the
38numerical process. More accurate calculations can be made, but the present work
illustrates the economics of the output space as it is.
The lines lx
0 and lH
0 indicates where rent is maximized given ﬁxed H and ﬁxed x,
respectively. To ﬁnd the lines lx
0 and lH
0 , the rent ˇ π is estimated by interpolation in a
1000 × 1000 regular grid laid down over the x × H space. The lx
0 and lH
0 lines are
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The line as deﬁnd in (17) and (18) correspond to the dashed lines in ﬁgure 5.
The line lH
∞ and lx
∞ indicates where there is no short term gain from changing H

























































∞ is then found as the red line in ﬁgure 5.
To ﬁnd the lx
∞ the net in sea price is deﬁned as:
NS(ξ) =
´ ∞
−∞ P θ(x,ξ)N (ex)





The numerator is the rent per effort, and the denominator is the mass of the harvest
per effort. The net in sea price then indicates what the immediate net income per
harvest with a changed target size will be, that is, with a change of the mean size. The
point where the NS, given the steady state population, does not change when target is















































Table 1: Overview of the used ∆·
A.3 Partial derivatives








f(y0 + ∆y) − f(y0 − ∆y)
2∆y
The closer to the limit of ∆y → 0, the better the approximation is if the functional val-
ues are found analytically. When the values are found numerically, and are therefore
only approximations, the error on the approximation will eventually be on the same
scale as ∆y. It is therefore a trade off between having a small ∆y to give precise esti-
mates and having a not too small ∆y to avoid the inﬂuence of the numeric noise. To
ﬁnd the indicator rate w is to ﬁnd the discount rate where the partial derivative of the
capital value is zero. The discussion below of ﬁnding the proper ∆· in the calculation
of w is therefore the same problem. In table 1 is given the ∆· used in the numeric
calculus.
A.4 Capital value calculations
In the numeric implementation of the model, the rent ﬂow is discrete and the rent πt is
the sum of the rent in period t to t + ∆t. In order to transform this into a continuous
40rent ﬂow, it must be normalized to the time unit by dividing by the time step: The









The numerical implementation has, however, a ﬁnite time period of T, and the rent is










where CT is the capital value at time T. At time T, ﬂuctuation in the model system
caused by the management action is almost gone. If the constant yearly rent ﬂow from
the resource in the steady state the system converges to after the management action












+ e−ρT ˇ π
ρ
(26)










e−ρt − e−ρ(t+∆t) πt(A)





e−ρt − e−ρ(t+∆t) πt(B)
ρ∆t + e−ρT ˇ π(B)
ρ = 0
(27)
where action A is a small change of control variables, and action B is the same change
with opposite sign.
For the indicator rate to be a useful concept for evaluation of management options,
the w has to be well-deﬁned. Well-deﬁned means that, for a small change, the w has
to be independent of the chosen ∆·. Preferably, the w would be deﬁned in the limit for
∆· → 0. Equivalent to the discussion of the size of ∆ when ﬁnding the partials, there
































































Figure 12: The stability of the w with different ∆ξ. In the upper diagram, the w is
given on a scale from 0.28 to 0.3. In the lower diagram, the observations are magniﬁed
so that the scale is ±0.0001 around w. The investigated point is the optimum point
given ρ = 0.3 found by interpolation, and the grey line indicates w = 0.299452621.
42precise w and having a larger change to avoid the inﬂuence of the numeric noise. In
ﬁgure 12 is shown the w found with different ∆ξ. In the upper diagram, the found
w is plotted on a scale from 0.28 to 0.3. In the lower diagram, the observations are
magniﬁed so the scale is ±0.0001 around w = 0.29945. With a ∆ξ < 10−2, the w
seems to be well-deﬁned, when ∆ξ < 10−9, the numeric noise begins to inﬂuence the
result. The system can also be said to be homogeneous with respect to small changes
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